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News :: International
Brian Conley, Independent Journalist from Boston hosts Online Videoblog from Iraq
by The Oppressor
01 Jun 2006
Modified: 07:18:58 PM
This first episode details the situation of displaced Iraqis who are now living in a refugee camp outside Fallujah.
The included video was provided to us by an Iraqi production team at a press conference concerning the camp. The footage was provided to the Rafidain channel, but as far as we know has not aired previously. The audio leaves something to be desired, but everything has been subtitled in English.
The next episode will detail the lives of refugees in the Ruweishid Refugee camp on Jordan’s border with Iraq. We expect to upload one episode per week, on Monday or Tuesday, as well as various full-length interviews throughout the week.
These photos are from the Ruweishid Refugee Camp.
You can view the first video here: <http://blip.tv/file/37274>
Here is the latest story from http://www.aliveinbaghdad.org:
Badr Groups Move from Troubled Past to Uncertain Future
Published by Brian May 30th, 2006. Tags: Badr Militia Force Forces Corps Organisation Organization IPS Inter Press Service Interpress SCIRI Dawa Haider Muhammad Zaher Mehdi Army Mahdi Army Muqtada Sadr Ali Al Sistani Khalilzad Saddam opposition death squads deathsquads kidnapping killing murder .
Analysis by Brian Conley and Muhammad Zaher
BAGHDAD, May 30 (IPS) - It could be instructive to recall that the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and its armed wing, the Badr Corps, arose from a conference of Iraqi opposition parties called in Iran in 1982.
The Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) was a breakaway faction of the Da’wa movement that had been outlawed in Iraq.
The Badr Corps, estimated before the war to be approximately 10,000 to 15,000 strong was similarly outlawed, along with its parent organisation, the SCIRI. The Badr Corps was considered a terrorist group by Saddam’s regime.
But in 2002 and 2003, the SCIRI and the Badr Corps, also known as the Badr militia, joined negotiations with United States officials, including now ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad over the liberation of Iraq.
During initial negotiations, it was proposed that the Badr Corps would participate in the invasion of Iraq alongside U.S. troops. That plan was abandoned in January 2003. It was decided at this time that the United States would temporarily administer Iraq, through what became the Coalition Provisional Authority.
At this January meeting, Ayatollah Bakir al-Hakim from the Badr Corps (who was killed in August 2003) told Zalmay Khalilzad that if the United States presence began to appear like an occupation, he would order his forces to attack Coalition troops.
Badr groups have emerged now from those controversial origins. Members of the Badr Corps, now known as the Badr Organisation, reflected on the change, and how it came about, in the course of several conversations with IPS.
A Badr member who gave his name as Abu Haider told IPS that while the group did not participate in the initial invasion, the Badr Corps swiftly joined the coalition forces “to destroy Saddam’s regime.”
Soon after the invasion two militant Shia groups became visible in Iraq — the Badr Corps and Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mehdi Army. These groups have long been engaged in conflict with one another, each vying for control over Iraq’s Shia majority.
Although the Badr Organisation initially paid homage to Ayatollah Bakir al-Hakim, after his death in August 2003 there was apparently a split in the organisation, between direct allegiance to Hakim’s brother, Abd al-Aziz, who is also an Ayatollah, and Iraq’s Grand Ayatollah, Ali al-Sistani.
“I follow al-Sistani, and I’m not with al-Sadr in his opposition to the occupation, because we need the U.S. troops help at this time, in order to kill the terrorists,” Abu Haider said.
Muqtada al-Sadr’s vocal opposition to the occupation of Iraq by the U.S. and Britain has placed him at odds with some of the larger Shia parties in Iraq.
Abu Haider explained the position of his organisation and the Shia parties that oppose Muqtada al-Sadr. “When we have a strong government and control of Iraq, our religious leaders will ask them to leave Iraq.”
When the interim government of Iyad Allawi took power in 2004, Iraqis began to play a greater role in Iraq’s domestic security issues. A ministry of the interior was established to supervise Iraq’s police and non-military security problems.
Iraq’s Sunnis accuse the Badr Corps of infiltrating the Iraqi police, largely made up of Shias. When Bayan Jabr Solagh became minister of the interior in 2005, their concern was greatly exacerbated.
Bayan Jabr was the head of the Badr Corps before he took up position as minister. Jabr has repeatedly denied accusations that the Badr Corps was controlling and directing the Iraqi police.
But under public pressure the Badr Corps was disbanded, and replaced by the Badr Organisation, ostensibly with a new focus on domestic aid.
Because of Muqtada al-Sadr’s opposition to the United States and other coalition nations, members of the Mehdi Army did not play a large role in the new Iraqi police. The common assumption, therefore, has been that Badr’s ideology, if not its leaders directly, played a strong role in directing the actions of Iraq’s police.
The Mehdi Army aside, Abu Haider believes it is a misconception that there is a nationalist resistance in Iraq. “There is no real resistance in Iraq; they fight for personal reasons or for revenge. Also, some of them fight to return Saddam to power.”
Sunni groups have called on Iraq’s Shia parties, particularly on new Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to disband and disarm the militias because of their role in sectarian violence, torture, and arbitrary arrests and killings of Iraqis.
Sunni parties have also alleged that the Badr Organisation and certain Shia parties still owe allegiance to Iran. Through government or outside of it, Badr groups continue to play a significant role in shaping political life in Iraq.
This work is in the public domain