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News :: Human Rights
Schlund Vs. Bush Update --- Part 2 of 2
10 Jul 2006
People should follow this lawsuit VERY closely. Unless it is [illegally] blocked, it can force Bush out of office!
Therefore, it was prejudicial error for the Court to dismiss the First Amended Complaint with prejudice, depriving Plaintiff of his due process rights under the Fourth Amendment.

Defendant cites the Supreme Court decision of Hagans v. Levine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974) for his primary position that the “substantiality doctrine” controls over the matter of jurisdiction, justifying the premature dismissal of the underlying action and requests for the appeal to be dismissed as well. However, Defendant’s position is grossly misstated and misplaced. In fact, the Hagans v. Levine decision by the high court fully supports Plaintiff Schlund’s position. In the Hagans v. Levine case, the complaint alleged a deprivation, under color of state law, of constitutional rights within the meaning of a federal statute, the District Court’s heard the matter under its pendent jurisdiction because of a conflict between federal and state law. Similar to Schlund, the federal jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1343, with Defendant Bush agreeing the District Court had jurisdiction and agreed the Appellate Court has jurisdiction as well (RB, pg. 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and Plaintiff Court jurisdiction 28 U.S.C. § 1291). Both claims involved a deprivation of civil rights, with the exception Plaintiff Schlund’s claim is under the federal statute, “Deprivation of Civil Rights,” and there is no state statute involved, bringing his claim exclusively under federal law based on a federal statute with its specific intent to allow a federal cause of action for deprivation of civil rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution, such as Schlund as pled (Excerpt No. 1). Defendant Bush’s self-serving and selective citation that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within the jurisdiction, if they are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, wholly insubstantial [or] obviously frivolous, is outside the controlling substantive context of the Hagans v. Levine decision, especially as to jurisdiction (Excerpt No. 1, pgs. 1-2). Like in Plaintiff Schlund’s case, the Supreme Court in the Hagan’s case held that when a federal statute which has the intent of Congress conferring (pre-emption) jurisdiction of a violation of a federal statute with Constitutional issues, the U.S. District Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the matter, and the substantiality provision is satisfied for the redress of the deprivation, of which the federal statute is intended to prevent.

The Supreme Court then concluded, “It is also plain that the complaint formally alleged such a deprivation,” – the substantiality doctrine is satisfied. Contrary to Defendant Bush’s citation (RB, pg. 9, par. 2), the Supreme Court of the United States stated, “Over the years this Court has repeatedly held that the federal courts are without power to entertain claims otherwise within their jurisdiction if they are ‘so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit’ (citations omitted by undersigned), held first that ‘[in] the absence of diversity of citizenship, it is essential to jurisdiction that a substantial federal question should be presented’…” Again, the Supreme Court’s decision in Hagan fully supports Plaintiff Schlund’s position on the grounds (1) it is based on the federal statute of deprivation of civil rights, (2) the matter in controversy exceeds the value of $75,000.00, (3) “involves part of diverse citizenship or status under the Constitution”, and (4) there is diversity of citizenship alleged between the parties (Excerpt No. 1, pgs. 1-4).

In the determination of the “constitutional insubstantiality” test, for this purpose, it has been equated with such concepts as “essentially fictitious,” “wholly insubstantial,” “obviously frivolous,” or “obviously without merit,” which have been defined by the Supreme Court. “The limiting words ‘wholly’ and ‘obviously’ have cogent legal significance. In the context of the effect of prior decisions upon the substantiality of constitutional claims, those words import that claims are constitutionally [415 U.S. 528, 538] insubstantial only if the prior decisions inescapably render the claims frivolous; previous decisions that merely render claims of doubtful or questionable merit do not render them insubstantial for the purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 2281. A claim is insubstantial only if ‘its unsoundness so clearly results from the previous decisions of this Court as to foreclose the subject and leave no room for the inference that the questions sought to be raised can be the subject of controversy.” (Citations omitted and bold type added by undersigned for emphasis.)

“The substantiality doctrine as a statement of jurisdictional principles affecting the power of the federal court to adjudicate constitutional claims has been questioned (Bell v. Hood) and characterized as ‘more ancient than analytically sound,’ Rosado v. Wyman, supra at 404.” The Court then concluded Petitioner’s complaint alleged a constitutional claim “sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the District Court to pass on the controversy.” (Id.) “Jurisdiction is essentially the authority conferred by Congress to decide a given type of case, one way or the other. Fair v. Kohler Die Co., (1913).” The Supreme Court then concluded that when a federal statute “unquestionably authorized federal courts to entertain suits to redress the deprivation, under color of state law, of constitutional rights, the substantiality doctrine is satisfied. It is also plain that the Complaint formally alleged such a deprivation. The District Court’s jurisdiction, a matter for threshold determination, turned on whether the question was too insubstantial for consideration and then concluded because the state law was rationally based and free from invidious discrimination and was based on a federal statutory claim, the U.S. District Court was automatically vested with statutory substantial jurisdiction to hear the redress for the deprivation (Id.). The Supreme Court then stated that the better analytical reasoning in its previous decision in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) should be followed, which completely negates Defendant Bush’s position here**.


** The Supreme Court in Hagans v. Levine, “We think the admonition of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946) should be followed here: ‘Jurisdiction…is not defeated as Respondents seem to contend, by the possibility that the averments might fail to state a cause of action on which Petitioners could actually recover. For it is well settled that the failure to state to a proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits, and not for a dismissal for want of jurisdiction. Whether the Complaint states a cause of action on which relief could be granted is a question of law, and just as issues of fact, it must be decided after and not before the court has assumed jurisdiction over the controversy. If the court does later exercise it’s jurisdiction to determine that the allegations in the Complaint do not state a ground for relief, then dismissal of the case would be on the merits, not for want of jurisdiction. (Id. at 682, citations omitted).” The Court then reasoned that, “Given a constitutional question over the District Court had jurisdiction, it also had jurisdiction over the ‘statutory’ claim (Id.).” The Supreme Court then reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings, compelling the U.S. District court to decide the matter as the substantiality doctrine had been satisfied based on the federal statute claim involving constitutional deprivation of rights.


Therefore, Defendant’s position asserting the “substantiality doctrine” asserting the federal court is required to conduct an initial review of the Complaint on its face to determine whether the merits are sufficiently substantial to engage the subject matter jurisdiction of the Court is a misstatement of the Supreme Court decision of Hagens v. Devine, as the factual determination at the initial pleading stage only requires Plaintiff Schlund place Defendant Bush on reasonable notice of the facts that support the claim for the deprivation of his rights. This has irrefutably been done, as admitted in Defendant’s Reply Brief (RB, pgs. 1-11).


Plaintiff’s Complaint consistently identifies Defendant Bush as an individual prior to taking office and thereafter as the President and who was engaged in, with other individuals under his influence and chain of command, targeting Plaintiff for perpetual illegal electronic wireless telemetry surveillance and other methods of invading his privacy discussed in the Koyomejian case, including illegal wire tapping (Excerpt No. 1). Bush, prior to being appointed to the office of presidency, established a program (the “Program”) which continued after taking office, of using wireless electronic telemetry surveillance to violate the privacy rights of Plaintiff, select individuals associated to him, and millions of others, protected under the United States First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution (Excerpt Nos. 1 and 3). Defendant Bush, in either capacity, never denies any of these verified allegations based on Plaintiff’s personal knowledge of his involvement with Defendant and those under his influence and chain of command, nor can he without it being a blatant lie or intentional distortions based on lies and deception (Excerpt No. 1; Docket Nos. 1-54). In fact, it remains irrefutable that Defendant Bush’s blatant lies, deception, or distortions of the truth based on lies is a pattern of individual and executive practice in order to push the Program to continue to violate Plaintiff’s and other American’s rights and the never files any substantive opposition to any of Plaintiff’s pleadings or motions which suit him for those deprivation of civil rights, violating the federal laws and the United States Constitution*.


* Presently pending before the United States District Court, Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, is the case titled American Civil Liberties Union et al. v. National Security Agency et al., Case No. 2: 06 CV 10204, before the Honorable Anna Diggs Taylor on Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, where at p. 1, ftn. 1, it is stated: “As the Court noted in its Order of June 2, 2006, the government has not filed a substantive opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment; instead, it has petitioned the Court to stay consideration of Plaintiff’s motion under the Court has considered the government’s Motion to Dismiss.” See Plaintiff ACLU et al’s Reply Memorandum In Support of Its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed and pending in the case, a public record document which is self-authenticating (F.R.E. 902 and Rule 1005), of which Plaintiff Schlund asks the Court to take judicial notice under F.R.E. Rule 201(2)(f). The case involves exactly the same violations enunciated in Plaintiff’s Complaint (Excerpt No. 1).


Defendant Bush, whether as an individual or/and in his capacity as the President engaging in substantive activity resulting in the deprivation of civil rights of Plaintiff Schlund, can be subject to civil litigation and individual liability for injury and damages, as Plaintiff Schlund has alleged in his Complaint (Excerpt Nos. 1 and 3). Under the Constitution, Defendant Bush has no power to ignore the law, even in times of war or emergency, or under any other pretext, especially for the perpetual invasion of privacy through wireless electronic means or/and torture. At this junction, admission by Defendant Bush of his Program activities of perpetual surveillance and warrantless searches and/or searches done with warrants obtained under perjury and/or the use of torture and the ratification of torture in the public and judicial domain (Id.) prevent him from denying such activity in relation to Plaintiff’s allegations (Excerpt No. 1) or the liability that comes with the injury and damages to Plaintiff and Americans (Excerpt No. 1, par. 7). Bush individually and/or through his administrative officials (chain of command and those associated and related to him) have publicly conceded all of the facts necessary to substantiate Plaintiff’s allegations set forth in his Verified Complaint at this initial pleading stage to allow it to go forward (Excerpt No. 1). For example, Plaintiff alleged in his Complaint substantial ultimate and special facts supporting the theory of his case (Id.) that Defendant Bush as an individual and after becoming President was engaged in an ongoing and continuous pattern of activity falling under a racketeering description (described under federal statute), depriving him of his rights and causing him injury and damages (Excerpt No. 1). The activities Defendant is engaged in is part of the Program he pushes in the public domain before the American people, Congress, and now the judicial branch of the government (Id.). Defendant Bush, in either capacity, no longer denies (nor can he), that he has and continues to engage in illegal invasions of privacy through electronic wireless telemetry surveillance (National Security Agency under the executive branch, at the control of Defendant Bush), wire tapping, and other forms of trespass and invasion of privacy as noted by this Ninth Circuit Court in its decision in United States v. Koyomejian, 980 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. en banc), cert. denied 946 F.2d 1450 (1991) and other Supreme Court of the United States and Circuit case law cited herein. In the Central Arizona area, Defendant, through his chain of command and in association with other individuals, is perpetually engaged in the exact surveillance and wire tapping etc. violations and routinely intentionally violates and deprives individuals associated to Plaintiff Schlund and others in the exact same manner admitted by Defendant Bush (Excerpt Nos. 1 and 3). Plaintiff has continuously stated to the Court this can easily be proved with individual identification connected to the location(s) in which the illegal activities are carried out on a routine daily basis, previously in relation to and now part of and in conjunction with the Program**.


** The only difference now is once Defendant is ready to selectively target a subject individual with its Program protocol systematic “options,” it suddenly justifies the supplemental option and then moves the illegal surveillance out of the context of the execution of supplemental option, cloaking it with legitimacy to maintain execution of the Program as stated above. Not only is the manner and procedural methodology of executing the field operation by Defendant Bush and those associated to him illegal, depriving Plaintiff Schlund and those associated to him, of their constitutional rights to privacy, etc., but is also cloaked under the pretext of a risk assessment field operations activity under discretionary determination, without adequate or proper overview for the determination of violation of constitutional rights by the individuals who carry out the activities at the field level. This can easily be proven by Plaintiff Schlund and his experts (Excerpt Nos. 1 and 3). Needless to say, Bush and the specific individuals are openly exposed and subject to civil litigation attack for individual liability of class action lawsuits, which they now face, which the ACLU, the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and others have made clear to Defendant Bush, supra.


Plaintiff Schlund’s injury and damages set forth in his Complaint (Excerpt No. 1) is concrete and particularized, even to the point ad nauseum, “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the Defendant” and “likely,” in fact, very likely, to be redressed by a favorable decision for Plaintiff. See, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 (2000). Because Defendant Bush and those associated with him are engaged in the exact illegal pattern of conduct, resulting in the deprivation of civil rights and the violation of attorney-client and other well established privileges, Defendants are being sued by the best lawyers in America (ACLU, National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and an abundance of individual American lawyers; Id., ACLU et al., v. National Security Agency, et al., Case No. 2:06-CV-10204 (Feb. 2006) (U.S. Dist. Ct., E.D. Mich.) [Hon. Anna Diggs Taylor]) on verified allegations exactly as alleged in Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint supported with affidavits (Excerpt No. 1) on grounds the attorney-client and other federally recognized privileges are being violated through electronic wireless telemetry and warrantless wire taps in violation of and deprivation of their civil rights, which the Court has been asked to take judicial notice of Case No. 2:06-CV-10204 before the Honorable Judge Taylor. Defendant Bush and those connected with him fear the potential decision related to his illegal conduct because the judge believes in the Socratic method*. Plaintiff Schlund has alleged in his Complaint that the illegal pattern of
conduct by Defendant Bush and those associated with him erects an additional obstacle to having a fair trial: Defendant
systematically engages in witness tampering by killing witnesses, extorting witnesses, blackmailing witnesses, threatening or intimidating witnesses’ children, invading the aforesaid’s privacy and those associated with the aforesaid as part of the Program (Excerpt No. 1, pgs. 7, 10-12, 15-17, and Excerpt No. 3). Oddly, but consistently, Plaintiff Schlund has alleged this over the last 28 years; and the case before United States District Judge Taylor has been alleging it since February, 2006 through present (Id.). Oddly, it appears the attorneys that represent Defendant Bush in Plaintiff Schlund’s action have a little more fearful respect for the ACLU et al. attorneys, as Defendant’s attorneys have never taken a position in the ACLU case that the allegations are “bizarre, unmeritorious, fictitious, or unbelievable” (Id. with F.R.E. 201). In fact, when an objective person or Appellate Justice views the Docket (Docket Nos. 1-54) of the acts and conduct of Judge Mathis and the ridiculous and inconsistent position by Defendant and his attorneys, only an incompetent idiot or a blatant liar would think that Plaintiff Schlund’s case lacks merit (Excerpt No. 1), at least at the initial pleading stage. Defendant Bush lies out of both sides of his mouth to attempt to cover-up his illegal activity, depriving Plaintiff Schlund and other Americans of their civil rights, in violation of the Constitution and the unfortunate attorney assigned to try to protect him for the illegal acts and conduct causing injury and damages.


* That Socratic method is posted on the inside of the United States District Court of Arizona for all of the public and its federal judges to believe and operate by: “To Hear Courteously. To Answer Wisely. To Consider Soberly. To Decide Impartially,” by Socrates. The implication of Socrates’ statement is that a federal judge should be fair, objective, impartial, and yield to her oath to uphold the United States Constitution, even if it doesn’t benefit the President of the United States.


It must be extremely embarrassing and humiliating for a competent, experienced Assistant Attorney with the honorable Attorney General’s Office to have to assert an unmeritorious and dishonest position on behalf of Defendant, especially since Attorney Richard G. Patrick took various oaths to uphold the United States Constitution as well.

The seriousness of Plaintiff Schlund’s injuries cannot be overstated and are alleged in detail (Excerpt No. 1). Plaintiff admits he possesses a great deal of personal knowledge due to his personal involvement at one stage in his life with the Program; and although the general substance, which can be easily substantiated by his confidential sources, including his experts, are not yet known to Defendant, such sources are particularly sensitive to the threat of exposure by the Defendant, which is why they remain confidential until a jury trial on the merits can occur. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 693 (1972). It has become obvious that Plaintiff Schlund absolutely cannot get a fair, objective, and impartial judge to allow his case to go forward before a jury of his peers against Defendant and those connected to him, as it would result in the cleanout of specific federal court judges and others connected to the field operational activities, including warrantless or illegal searches, illegal invasion of privacy, military and quasi-military operations, and the disclosure of co-confidential sources connected to both Plaintiff and Defendant who are sensitive to the threat of exposure but realize the necessity of the disclosure to curtail the illegal activity of illegal surveillance through electronic wireless telemetry and torture of Plaintiff and those associated with him (Excerpt No. 1). See Branzburg supra. As stated in Plaintiff Schlund’s Complaint, he has been injured and damaged by the Program’s field operation activities, as the illegal invasion of privacy and torture of him violates the importance of confidentiality to the attorney-client relationship, physician-patient relationship, and the like, due to Defendant’s widespread illegal monitoring of those privileged relationships and Defendant’s attempted interception of the attorney-client and other communications between Plaintiff Schlund where the privileged communications reach (Excerpt No. 1, pgs. 6-10, 13, 15-16, 18). See Defendant’s admission in his pattern of conduct under his Program, intercepting and violating, including but not limited attorney-client communications. See, Turkmen v. Ashcroft, No. 02-CV-2307 (EDNY, May 30, 2006). The Court found Plaintiffs (like Plaintiff Schlund) were entitled to “attain some degree of comfort that they and their clients may communicate without the chilling specter of government eavesdropping. That the significance of attorney-client privilege and its goal of frank and candid communications between a represented party and his counsel are too well settled to require a lengthy citation.” (Id., Slip Op. at 6, citations omitted.) Recently, various enforcement agencies in the State of Arizona were held with their feet to the fire for violating an unsettled amount of attorneys’ privacy, including the attorney-client privilege, which also exposed those individuals to liability. Plaintiff Schlund has touched upon this repeatedly in his Complaint as it applies to him (Excerpt No. 1). Plaintiff’s verified allegations in this respect, along with the other injuries and damages caused to his professional activities constitute an injury sufficient to support his lawsuit against Defendant. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 194 (1976); Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 113 (1976). This includes anyone connected to Plaintiff Schlund, justifying “standing” to interplead into his case or marshal an independent case against said Defendant and other persons associated to him, even on the grounds he is a political witness and a whistle-blower with personal knowledge of Defendant’s activities (Excerpt No. 1). See, Clark v. Library of Congress, 750 F.2d 89, 93 (D.C. Cir. 1984) [Court found worker had standing to sue his government employer for triggering and FBI investigation into the worker’s political associations, where the investigation had cost the employee potential employment opportunities]; Paton v. Law Prade, 524 F.2d 862, 868 (3rd Cir. 1975) [High school student had standing to seek expungement of an FBI file linking her with “subversive material” because of the potential that the file would harm the Plaintiff’s future educational and employment opportunities]; Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F.Supp. 561, 568 (E.D. Mich. 1979), vac-d on other grounds sub-nom. Jabara v. Webster, 691 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1982) [The Court held an attorney had standing to sue to enjoin unlawful FBI and NSA surveillance because the investigation had deterred others from associating with him and cause “injury to his reputation and legal business.”] Plaintiff Schlund has alleged these identical allegations (Excerpt No. 1) years before they surfaced, while Defendant claims they are surreal, fantastic, and fictitious, yet other United States District Court judges have blatantly disagreed, understanding the realities of Defendant’s illegal conduct**.


** Why is it that District Court Judge Mathis cannot understand the simple truths alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint and, like the other select judges on the Arizona judicial panel, where Plaintiff’s case has been specifically routed to, with back-chamber discussion between those federal judges targeted by Plaintiff Schlund, based on his personal knowledge or their illegal activity, and ex-parte unilateral communication with select others, including assistant A.G. attorneys?


Defendant Bush’s attack on Plaintiff Schlund’s purported mental/emotional state of mind after years of being tortured, and his inartful use of words to describe the illegal acts and conduct by Defendant and those associated with him, ignores the specific and concrete harm caused by the Program, including field operations activities, is having a direct cause on Plaintiff’s abilities to carry out his professional responsibilities and activities, depriving him of his due process and other rights guaranteed under the United States Constitution*.


* Plaintiff Schlund would satisfy the requirements at the initial pleading state, even if he had not suffered concrete injury as he has alleged, and standing would still be vested to him, along with the substantial justification criteria established under the Supreme Court case of Hagans v. Levine supra., because the traditional rules for standing or jurisdiction are relaxed at the initial pleading stage, especially when First Amendment rights are at stake, such as here. The well established First Amendment exception to normal standing and relaxed jurisdictional application is necessary because “free expression is of transcendent value to all society and not merely to those exercising their rights.” Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965); see also Virginia v. American Book Sellers Assoc., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392-393 (1988); Sec-y of State of Md. v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956-57 (1984) and Excerpt Nos. 1 and 3.


Plaintiff Schlund has also complained he has suffered injuries as other person(s) no longer or have refused to associate with him because of his litigation activities against Defendant and those associated with Defendant (Excerpt Nos. 1 and 3). Defendant Bush has claimed he understands Plaintiff’s allegations in this regard (including over the years), but then self-servingly classifies them as being bizarre and fantastic (Excerpt No. 2; RB, p. 6, ftn. 3). Here, Defendant’s illegal perpetual invasion of privacy and the torture of Plaintiff of the Surveillance Program at issue, as set forth in Plaintiff’s Complaint, are both unlawful and unconstitutional. Plaintiff Schlund is not merely asserting general allegations concerning Defendant Bush’s pattern of activities connected to the Program’s “mere existence without more.” He has asserted serious and concrete injuries to his abilities to carry out his professional activities, including the loss of his business, diminished earning capacity, emotional and physical injuries (Excerpt No. 1). Defendant understands that the long-term effect of Defendant’s illegal activities of perpetual surveillance and torture of Plaintiff has caused him serious and severe damages, personally and professionally, of a concrete and substantiated nature, liability for which has been alleged to be in the millions of dollars, which can be established by Plaintiff’s expert forensic economist at time of trial (Excerpt No. 1). Defendant has finally admitted publicly his involvement with illegal, unlawful, and unconstitutional surveillance and torture, the type of which Plaintiff Schlund has set forth in his Verified Complaint (Excerpt No. 1). Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfield, 410 F.Supp. 144, 150-51 (1976) (Id.). Defendant admits the illegal and perpetual surveillance activities through the use of electronic wireless telemetry system(s) and associated electronic product(s) has caused injury and damage to Plaintiff, including his freedom of association (Excerpt Nos. 1 and 2). The Ninth Circuit addressed a similar issue in Presbyterian Church v. United States, 870 F.2d 518 (9th Cir. 1989). In Jabara v. Kelley, 476 F.Supp. at 568, it was determined that the FBI’s investigation caused injury to the Plaintiff because “others have been deterred from associating with him,” and they were held liable for the injury and damages.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s assertions in his Complaint about the plans integrated into Defendant’s Programs which involved the perpetual invasion of privacy through wireless electronic telemetry and associated electronic products, warrantless searches or illegal searches and torture of Plaintiff, have resulted in the deprivation of his civil rights and was prejudicial error for the Court to dismiss it with prejudice, as was the fabrication of words by Judge Mathis to support her judgment in dismissing the case based on initial pleadings.


Plaintiff set forth Defendant Bush’s and those associated to him, illegal activity(ies) in his Complaint (Excerpt Nos. 1 and 3). The facts of the Program were well-known to Plaintiff, who was personally involved (Excerpt No. 1). Defendant finally, over 20 years later, has come out in the public and admitted the facts of the use of electronic wireless telemetry surveillance system(s), its general technology, and the electronic wireless product(s) (although not in scientific detail, which Plaintiff can prove), and the manner in which the illegal interceptions are carried out by the NSA and others pled in Plaintiff’s Complaint (Excerpt No. 1). The facts of the Program are well known to experts. Approved by President Bush in the fall of 2001, the Program entails the illegal interception, without a warrant or any other type of judicial authorization, of the illegal electronic communications of people inside the United States. The Court can take judicial notice of the “Hearings on the Nomination of General Michael V. Hayden, to be the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency Before the Select Commission on Intelligence, 109th Cong., at 72 (2006).” [General Michael Hayden, describing an interception under the Program: “[W]e have bumped into the privacy rights of a protected person, okay? And no warrant is involved, okay? We-we don’t go to a court.”] The Court is requested to take judicial notice of these admitted facts of the Program, which is already in place by Defendant Bush and mirrored by others but not revealed, and in fact hidden from the public concerning the CIA, NSA, and others connected to Defendant Bush, as Plaintiff Schlund alleged and has alleged for years (Excerpt No. 1; RB 1-10). The Program entails the interception, without a warrant or any other type of judicial authorization, of the wireless telemetry electronic communications of people inside the United States; and the illegal interceptions are approved by an NSA “shift supervisor” without probable cause to believe that the select surveillance targets have committed or are about to commit any crime, and without probable cause to believe that the electronic wireless telemetry surveillance used on such select surveillance targets are foreign agents. Id. Rather, Defendant Bush, through his purported executive powers, influences and controls those under his chain of command or those associated to him and/or the chain (such as alleged in Plaintiff’s Complaint, Excerpt No. 1), including the NSA, who intercepts communications when the Agency has, in its own discretionary judgment, merely a “reasonable basis to conclude” that one party to the communication is a member of (as testified in that context) Al Qaeda, affiliated with Al Qaeda, or a member of an organization affiliated with the aforesaid or working in support of it. Defendant Bush has publicly admitted, in addition to the aforesaid, millions of Americans, including Plaintiff Schlund (Excerpt Nos. 1 and 3) have been placed under wireless electronic perpetual surveillance through the use of such system(s) technologies and associated electronic wireless product(s) used for that purpose (Excerpt No. 1) to intercept or directly receive his communications under Defendant’s Program, verifying his continuous pattern of conduct of illegal electronic surveillance, warrantless or illegal surveillance, and other violations of Plaintiff Schlund’s (and others associated with him) constitutional rights, resulting in the violation and deprivation of such rights.

Therefore, in short, Plaintiff Schlund’s case was prematurely dismissed on unmeritorious procedural grounds, causing further deprivation of his rights. It also has the effect of placing Defendant Bush as an individual or in any other capacity above the law, which is prohibited. See Clinton v. Jones, supra. Defendant Bush’s activities of perpetual electronic wireless telemetry and torture of Plaintiff Schlund (Excerpt No. 1) are illegal and unlawful as violations and deprivation of his civil rights guaranteed under the Constitution. The Supreme Court has not hesitated to hold unlawful actions that “accrete to a single Branch powers more appropriately diffused among separate Branches.” See, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989). All of the courts must remain diligent to ensure that power is never “condense[d]…into a single branch of government.” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 (plurality opinion). As the Court recently has warned, “A state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes to the right of the nation’s citizens.” Id. at 536. “It remains one of the most vital functions of this Court to police with care the separation of the governing powers… When structure fails, liberty is always in peril.” See, Public Citizen v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 468 (1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring). Plaintiff Schlund has pled in his Complaint that the vital functions of the Court in allowing him to redress and hold Defendant liable for his injury and damages caused by Defendant’s violation and intentional deprivation of his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as set forth in his Complaint, are sufficient at the initial pleading stage to compel Defendant to answer the Complaint and engage in discovery so the truth can come out. Defendant Bush will no doubt be held liable, along with many others who are engaged in this illegal and criminal activity, resulting in the violation of Plaintiff’s rights, causing him injuries and damages in amounts according to proof (Excerpt No. 1). Even a cursory review under the United States District Court of Arizona judges, which Defendant so aptly cites (RB, pg. 6, ftn 3) indicate Plaintiff Schlund has never been allowed past the “initial” stages of pleading, being procedurally stopped, even through unilateral activities by the Court to cut off the redress of the violation of his Constitutional Rights by Defendant Bush and/or those associated to him under his influence or chain of command and beyond (Excerpt No. 1).

As stated in the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in Youngston Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), by Justice Douglas, “[O]ur history and tradition rebel at the thought that the grant of military power carries with it authority over civilian affairs.” It appears that judges of the federal judicial system have become quasi-military power oriented divisions under the elite commander, Defendant Bush, and have forgotten their oaths to uphold the United States Constitution, instead yielding to executive power and influence, violating their oaths of office and ratifying violations of the Separation of Powers Act as well. Plaintiff Schlund has attempted to use the federal courts’ assigned task of determining what the law is and whether it has been followed by Defendant Bush for the redress of his rights against the Defendant as an individual and engaged in the same pattern of conduct after he was appointed to the office of President of the United States by the Supreme Court while it acknowledged the fixing of the presidential election, leaving it no choice but to appoint him, to swiftly eliminate the conflict (Excerpt No. 1). If Defendant Bush is free to ignore the law by the ratification of select judges, then it is impossible for the courts to exercise their role in enforcing the law and intrudes and violates the court’s judiciary role “to determine whether [the President] has acted within the law.” See Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 703 (1997).

On June 29, 2006, the Supreme Court of the United Staes held in its 5-4 decision, in fact, under Defendant’s Program of using electronic wireless telemetry surveillance to violate privacy and violate due process and torture a human being was unauthorized, illegal, and unconstitutional as a matter of law. The systemic field operations of a discretionary executive branch influenced by Defendant’s interpretation, including the U.S. Attorney General’s, foolishly justified the violations and deprivation of civil rights were flat wrong. Plaintiff Schlund has alleged the exact same issues in his Complaint. See, Hamdan v. Rumsfield, Case No. 05-184 (June 29, 2006). [Aforesaid Program activities are illegal, violating civil rights.]


The United States attorneys’ arguments are no different then the Nazi’s arguing that the concentration camps were just work or education camps. The Nazi’s injected subcutaneous implants into Jews and others in their necks after taking them under their control, systematically violating and depriving these victims of their human rights. This crime is no different then the United States making false claims that Plaintiff is a criminal and that the government is just bugging Plaintiff, as these American Nazi’s threaten and torture Plaintiff Schlund with the implants installed in Plaintiff’s neck and make Plaintiff sick and torture Plaintiff Schlund, depriving him of sleep after forcibly installing the monitoring and torture devices to stop Plaintiff from exercising his constitutional rights in the government’s cover-up of the fixing of the presidential elections of the United States. The crime is the same crime that the Nazi’s committed word for word. The Nazi’s in Germany were convicted of crimes against humanity for their evil and criminal actions. Bush is not Clinton, and Bush is protected and cannot be prosecuted for his crimes. The DOJ and law enforcement in Arizona, integrated into the information/activity Program, will always plant new evidence to frame Plaintiff Schlund as being involved in some bizarre, fantastic and surreal crime as they have for 28 years so they can cover up their crimes and protect the Bush family by removing Plaintiff as a political witness with the use of torture, using so called monitoring devices to torture with. For the court to rule in favor of the Defendant would force Plaintiff Schlund, under torture and under the threat of death by the court, to flee the United States to try to get the torture devices removed and force Plaintiff to return under an assumed name to try to write books that the government has, to date, tortured Plaintiff to prevent him from writing. Plaintiff Schlund is under constant torture and threat of death by the United States through the Bush family and the government’s attempts of stopping him from writing and documenting the facts in this case. Plaintiff Schlund is being tortured and electronically held under the threat of death and constant torture and sleep deprivation to cover-up the crimes Plaintiff read about in the United documents called the Don Boles Papers and/or which he witnessed, including the plans to fix the elections of the United States. For the courts to allow this to continue procedurally would amount to the suspension of the American Constitution and the suspension of all civil rights and human rights laws. The American courts cannot allow the use of torture in investigations and then just refuse to allow the thousands of witnesses to testify to their torture and pretend that the torture and murders are not real. The court would have to be mad and insane to believe that the torture of suspected criminals is justified and can be allowed to continue under the cover of law and the protection of the courts using procedural maneuvers to stop the American people from addressing their grievances in court and trial by dismissing all the lawsuits procedurally prematurely.

The Bush family and the corrupt agents working for the Bush family will always plant evidence against Plaintiff Schlund and will always frame Plaintiff Schlund as being a criminal to justify their evil and corrupt actions. None of this evidence will ever be real, and none of the crimes would have ever existed without the government creating them by the use of torture and terrorism and the planting of the evidence. Plaintiff Schlund will never be arrested or tried in court for any of the crimes because the government cannot win in trial. The government will continue its Nazi-like actions and use procedural maneuvers to terrorize and attack Plaintiff and authorize the use of terrorism and torture in the overthrow of the United States. The use of electronic implants and other so called bugging devices which are really used for torture and control by the government is for the overthrow of the United States by the CIA and its covert operations, such as the DEA.

Plaintiff Schlund requests the court to stop this insane and mad paranoid criminal behavior by the courts and to uphold the American Constitution and its laws. Plaintiff Schlund will be traveling to other countries to document how the courts have covered up the use of implants in the cover-up of the fixing of the presidential elections of the United States. Plaintiff will offer to supply other countries with the information contained in the Don Bolles Papers in exchange for documenting the use of the implants by the United States, to be published for the American people to use in future trials and in the appeal to the United States Supreme Court in this case. The American courts will corruptly issue further warrants against Plaintiff Schlund to try to stop Plaintiff or assassinate Plaintiff during these travels in the search for justice which has been totally denied in the American Courts. Plaintiff Schlund asks the courts to uphold the Constitution and laws of the United States and stop the insane criminal investigations against Plaintiff using torture and implants. This lawsuit is not about firing darts into the eve of Plaintiffs house to monitor Plaintiff or the monitoring of the phone or internet. This lawsuit is over the use of terrorism in the form of torture and the framing of Plaintiff Schlund in the cover-up of the fixing of the presidential elections of the United States; and the court’s surreal and fantastic disbelief can only be classified as criminal corruption and the systematic suspension of the American Constitution, deprivation of human rights under the Constitution, and the overthrow of the United States.

As set forth above, “[O]urs is a government of laws, not of man and…we submit ourself to rulers only if under rules.” Youngston, 343 U.S. at 646; Jackson, J. concurring. This court is well aware it has been settled for almost forty (40) years that the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects against warrantless or illegal wire tapping and perpetual surveillance. See, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967); Blake v. Wright, 179 F.3d 1003, 1008 (6th Cir. 1999) [Wire tapping constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, Katz]. Defendant’s pattern of conduct and activity, now shoved under his “Program,” plainly violates Plaintiff Schlund’s Fourth Amendment rights (Excerpt Nos. 1 and 3). Defendant and those associated with him always deny they engage in perpetual invasion of privacy through use of electronic wireless telemetry and associated products out of one side of their mouth and out the other side of their mouth, likewise deny torture by Defendant, which has also been acknowledged and rebuked by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Siderman DeBlak v. Republic of Argentina, 946 F.2d 1450 (9th Circ. 1991) [Excerpt Nos. 1 and 3].
Dated this 30th day of June, 2006.

Respectfully submitted,


Charles A. Schlund, III

This work is in the public domain
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