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TERRORISM: Past, Present & Future (english)
25 Dec 2002
Copy of a paper for presentation at a conference on terrorism organised by the Institute For Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, on December 16 and 17, 2002
by B. Raman
The pre-9/11 debate on the theme freedom-fighters vs terrorists has largely lost its relevance due to the traumatic experience of the international community after the horrendous acts of 9/11 and thereafter in different parts of the world. There is now growing realisation in the world that the past attempts to rationalise the acts of terrorism of the organisations with national liberation as their objective by describing them as freedom-struggle have only played into the hands of terrorists. The cliche that one nation's terrorist is another nation's freedom-fighter, which was in vogue till the early 1980s, has been questioned seriously since the 1983 car bomb explosion in Beirut in which a large number of US Marines were killed. George Bush , the father of the present US President and the then Vice-President, who was appointed by President Ronald Reagan as the Chairman of a Presidential Task Force on Terrorism, formulated the first clear distinction between freedom-fighters and terrorists in 1988. He said that any group or organisation, which deliberately targeted innocent civilians, could not be categorised as freedom-fighters and had to be treated as terrorists. This distinction found increasing acceptance thereafter, particularly after the terrorists fighting for their so-called national liberation relied more and more on explosive devices instead of hand-held weapons in order to cause the maximum number of casualties amongst the civilians and shake the confidence of the people in the ability of the State to protect them. After the use of explosives by terrorists against the US Army barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and against the US naval ship USS Cole in Aden in October 2000, this distinction has been further amplified by the US to precise that attacks on armed military personnel and installations would also constitute acts of terrorism if they take place in an area outside a zone of conflict. The US State Department's annual report on the Patterns of Global Terrorism during 2000 said: " We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site. " After 9/11, there is unanimous agreement in the international community that terrorism should not be tolerated whatever be the cause.
Any indigenous terrorist movement in the territory of a country due to domestic causes without any foreign involvement has to be tackled at the operational as well as political level. While acts of terrorism must be prevented and the capability of the organisations for such acts of terrorism must be neutralised, these must be combined with a political approach marked by a search for a mutually acceptable political solution through negotiations with the leaders of the organisations, which have taken to terrorism. Where there is the involvement of foreign mercenaries and a foreign State in sponsoring the terrorism, the action against them has to be exclusively through operational means. There is no question of a political approach. No foreign national and no State should be allowed to indulge in or instigate acts of terrorism in the territory of another country, whatever be the cause.
The comparative lack of international interest in the separatist movements in India's North-East and Punjab and the co-operation received by India from the Western countries in dealing with terrorism in Punjab in the form of exchange of intelligence etc could be attributed to the fact that they recognised these areas as an integral part of India and were disinclined to support the demands of the insurgent and terrorist groups for secession from India. Their still lingering mental reservations in respect of J&K are due to the fact that they do not still recognise J&K as an area, whose legal status has been settled once and for all. Before 1995, the West was not even prepared to concede that there was terrorism in J&K. Only after the kidnapping of some American and West European tourists in 1995 by the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) under the name of Al Faran was there a willingness to recognise that there was terrorism in J&K.
Pakistan has been supporting all these terrorist movements---whether in the North-East or Punjab or J&K---but with nuances. In the case of J&K, it talks openly of its right to extend political, moral and diplomatic support to the terrorists, whom it projects as freedom-fighters, because it considers the territory as rightfully belonging to it. However, it denies giving military support to the terrorists anywhere--neither in J&K, nor in Punjab nor in the North-East. In the case of Punjab and the North-East, it does not talk of any right to extend political, moral or diplomatic support to the separatists since it recognises the areas affected by separatist movements as integral parts of India. There is no involvement of any Pakistan-based mercenary groups in any of these separatist movements in the North-East or Punjab, which have remained purely indigenous.
The main concern of the international community today is due to the aggravating conflict between the Palestinians and Israel and the sprouting of many Islamic terrorist groups in different parts of the world---some fighting for Islamic rule under the Sharia and some fighting for national liberation on grounds of distinct ethnic/religious identity--- and the attempts of bin Laden and his Al Qaeda to bring them together under a common umbrella of pan-Islamism. This networking through the International Islamic Front, under the leadership of Al Qaeda, has given them a capability to mount terrorist strikes in different parts of the globe. Their search for weapons of mass destruction and their avowed readiness to use them to protect Islam, if necessary, have made these pan-Islamic terrorists a major threat to world peace and security as recognised by the UN Security Council in its two resolutions passed after 9/11. Many of their objectives such as the creation of Islamic Caliphates in South-East, South and Central Asia have made it clear that the classical political approach of addressing the cause of terrorism would be meaningless in their case.
For counter-terrorism experts, dealing with pan-Islamic terrorist groups poses the greatest challenge. All the suggestions for standard policy palliatives from many analysts such as addressing the cause of terrorism, an economic package, better governance, etc will not put an end to their terrorism. Global co-opertation and intensification of the attempts to neutralise them are the only answer. At the same time, care has to be taken to see that the intelligence agencies and security forces do not drive more Muslims into the arms of these terrorists through over-reaction. Any impression that they are suspecting the Muslim communities as a whole because of some of their co-religionists taking to terrorism and unwise talk of clash of civilisations would only aggravate the feelings of alienation of the Muslims and play into the hands of the pan-Islamic terrorists.
A more nuanced approach would be necessary towards ideological and ethnic terrorist organisations and also towards religious terrorist organisations with no links to Al Qaeda and its associates. While Governments confronted with terrorist organisations of a class-oriented or issue-based or anarchist nature often succeed in bringing them under control, if not in totally eliminating them, by taking advantage of their lack of public support, Governments confronted with terrorist organisations, which are community or religion oriented, have difficulty in controlling them.
An important reason for this is the ambivalence of the community or the religious group from which these organisations have arisen. While the majority may not support the use of terror by these organisations to achieve their aims, their shared perception of their grievances, of the nature of the ruling power or administration and of their relationship with what they look upon as the adversary community or religious group make them hesitant or unwilling to back the ruling administration in its counter-terrorism operations. Another reason for their ambivalence is, of course, intimidation.
It is said that terrorism makes Hamlets of decision-makers. It poses more questions than it provides answers. How to deal with it? The soft option? The hard option? Administrative measures? Political measures? Political dialogue? If so, when and with whom? Firmness? Concessions? There are no copybook answers to these questions because there is no copybook method of dealing with terrorism. Everyone confronted with the menace has to learn from experience, the hard way.
However, certain observations have universal validity:
* Very few countries in the world have succeeded in ending indigenous terrorism through purely security measures.
* There has, therefore, to be a mix of security and political measures, but because of their centrifugal nature, terrorist organisations tend to be impervious to political approaches.
* The approach has, therefore, to be directed not to the organisation, but to the community from which the organisation has arisen.
* The community is generally reluctant to respond to such political approaches even if attracted by them because of intimidation and the ambiance of terror created by the terrorists.
* Thus, we come back to the beginning of the vicious circle ---how to deal with this ambiance of terror and free the population from its hold?
In counter-terrorism operations, effective protective measures are the sine qao non of success. Make it impossible for the terrorist to hijack or blow up a plane or to kidnap an individual. If despite all security measures he succeeds, stand firm and refuse to concede his demand. Deny him the aura of martyrdom by avoiding over-reaction in dealing with him. Deny him new recruits by winning over the population and by being receptive to their grievances. Deny him funds and weapons by choking his financial sources. Deny him the theatre which he needs for publicising his actions. If all this is done in an effective and sustained manner, his organisation will start withering away.
To make the terrorist organisation wither away, that should normally be the objective of any counter-terrorism operation except those directed against the Al Qaeda kind, which have to be neutralised ruthlessly. In order to make terrorism wither away, it has to be denied not only funds, arms and ammunition and sanctuaries, but also---and more importantly--new reservoirs of fresh recruits. Its motivation has to be diluted. The greater the anger in the community from which the terrorists have arisen, the greater the flow of new recruits and the stronger the motivation. It is, therefore, important to ensure that the way counter-terrorism operations are conducted does not add to the already existing anger. Counter-terrorism is a fight of the civilised force of the State against the uncivilised force of the terrorists. If the unwise actions of the State make the community perceive it as no different from the uncivilised force of the terrorists, half the battle against the terrorists is already lost. bin Laden does not go round looking for recruits. Enraged elements in the Islamic world go to Pakistan and Afghanistan looking for bin Ladens and their ilk to help them in giving vent to their anger appropriately.
THE TEXT OF THE PAPER
Terrorist organisations can be broadly divided into the following categories:
* Those whose objective is ideological and which are class and not community or religion oriented.
* Those who have the "the national liberation of their homeland" as their political objective. These are community and not class oriented.
* Those which are religion or sect oriented and come into being because of perceived grievances due to religious or sectarian causes.
* Those which are anarchist or issue-based such as those fighting for the protection of environment etc. They are generally urban-focussed and elitist and draw their leadership and following mainly from amongst intellectuals.
CATEGORISATION OF TERRORIST ACTS
2. Terrorist acts can be divided into three categories: objective terrorism, demand terrorism and punishment terrorism. An act of objective terrorism, which seeks to draw domestic and international attention to the objective of the organisation, is of a strategic nature. An act of demand terrorism is more of a tactical nature. It seeks to achieve a particular demand of a transient nature. The hijacking of an aircraft of the Indian Airlines by the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) in December,1999, to demand the release of some terrorist detenus was a typical act of demand terrorism.
3. Punishment terrorism, which could be strategic or tactical, is an act of terrorism consciously committed to punish a wrong-doer, who may be a State, a society, a community, a religious group, an economic organisation,an individual etc. It is retributive in nature and does not have any other objective or demand to be achieved beyond the act of retribution. It is the use of terrorism as a weapon to give vent to anger.
4. Whereas objective or demand terrorists generally identify themselves (example: Hamas, the various terrorist groups in Jammu & Kashmir etc) and claim responsibility or credit for their acts of terrorism, punishment terrorists may not always do so. Objective or demand terrorists want that their followers, their community and the international public opinion should know that they were behind the act of terrorism. For them, terrorism is one way of creating an awareness of their objective and demand.
5. Generally, religious terrorist groups resort to punishment terrorism but examples are not wanting of ideological, ethnic and other non-religious groups and even individuals resorting to punishment terrorism. Amongst the major examples of punishment terrorism by religious groups are: the blowing up of the Kanishka aircraft of the Air India off the Irish coast, the explosion at the Narita airport in Tokyo and the synchronised transistor radio explosions in New Delhi, all in 1985 by Sikh terrorists as acts of retribution for the alleged sacrilege of the Golden Temple in Amritsar by the Indian Army in June,1984; the World Trade Centre explosion in New York in February,1993, by some Muslim extremist elements who felt aggrieved over what they perceived as the betrayal by the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) after having used them to achieve US objectives against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan; the synchronised explosions in Mumbai (Bombay) in March, 1993, by Muslims associated with Dawood Ibrahim, the mafia leader, as retribution for the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December,1992, and for the alleged massacre of Muslims that followed in Mumbai without the Police protecting them; the explosion in the RSS ( a Hindu organisation) office in Chennai in August,1993, allegedly by elements close to the Al Ummah again because of anger over the demolition of the Babri Masjid;the explosions on many railway trains in North India in December,1993, allegedly by elements belonging to the Students' Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) to mark the first anniversary of the demolition of the Babri Masjid;the explosions outside the US barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996 by unidentified elements; the synchronised explosions in Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu in February,1998, allegedly by Al Ummah as a retribution for police excesses against the Muslims the previous year; the explosions outside the US Embassies in Nairobi and Dar-es-Salaam in August,1998, allegedly by Al Qaeda of Osama bin Laden; the attack on the US naval ship "USS Cole" in Aden in October,2000, reportedly by Al Qaeda; the terrorist strikes against the World Trade Centre in New York and the Pentagon in Washington DC on September 11, 2001, by Al Qaeda; the kidnapping and the beheading of Daniel Pearl, the American journalist of the "Wall Street Journal", by Pakistani terrorists associated with bin Laden in January-February, 2002; and the grenade attack on a church congregation in Islamabad on March 17, 2002, suspected to be by Pakistani terrorists belonging to the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ), a Sunni extremist organisation associated with bin Laden's International Islamic Front (IIF). Many of the subsequent acts of terrorism in Pakistan, Tunisia, Yemen, Bali in Indonesia and Mombasa in Kenya were also instances of punishment terrorism by different components of the IIF.
6. Amongst examples of punishment terrorism carried out by non-religious groups and individuals are the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, former Indian Prime Minister, by the LTTE in May,1991; the assassination of two CIA officers in Langley, Washington DC, by Mir Aimal Kansi of Pakistan in January,1993, who reportedly felt angry over the CIA's failure to keep up its promise to get him the US citizenship and a lucrative job in return for the services rendered by him against the Soviet troops in Afghanistan;and the explosion at the federal office building in Oklahoma, USA, in 1995 by Timothy McVeigh, who felt angry against the Federal Government for various reasons. The blowing-up of a Pan Am aircraft off Lockerbie in 1989 is viewed as an act carried out by the Libyan State as a retribution for the US bombing of Libya in 1986.
CATASTROPHIC TERRORISM & 9/11
7. There is no commonly accepted definition of catastrophic or new terrorism. However, there is growing convergence amongst professional counter-terrorism experts that catastrophic or new terrorism has one or more of the following components: Use of or threat to use a weapon of mass destruction (WMD); use of or threat to use a weapon of mass disruption such as a computer virus or hacking (WMDIS)to cause mass economic disruption; capture of or threat to capture an installation dealing with WMD such as a nuclear power station in order to cause mass panic; and use of or threat to use conventional weapons or instruments in an unconventional manner to cause fatal human casualties of 1,000 or more.
8. The significance of the terrorist strikes of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington DC is due to the following factors:
* Firstly, it was a major act of catastrophic punishment terrorism .
* Secondly, it was the first use of a conventional instrument ( a commercial airliner) in a hitherto unthought of unconventional manner to cause human casualties and material damage of dramatic proportions;
* Thirdly, it was successfully carried out in US territory despite the commonly-assumed competence of the US intelligence and security apparatus.
* Fourthly, it demonstrated the ease with which determined punishment terrorists have managed to penetrate the State's security fireline despite its powerful security apparatus as compared to the difficulty which the State faces in penetrating the terrorist apparatus.
* Fifthly, it demonstrated dramatically to the public the frightening mix of irrationality and rationality (mental lucidity) which is the defining characteristic of all terrorism and particularly punishment terrorism.
* Sixthly, it was a catastrophic act of terrorism watched live by millions of TV viewers all over the world, which posed a visible challenge to the credibility of the State, whether the State be in the US, Russia, China, India, Singapore, Australia or elsewhere and called for an equally visible and ruthless State response with all the might that the State is capable of in order to restore its credibility in the eyes of the people.
9. The irrationality of the punishment terrorists was seen in their willingness to kill thousands of innocent people to give vent to their anger without worrying about the revulsion which it might cause in the minds of the public or without asking themselves whether their act of retribution was in proportion to their anger over the perceived wrong-doing against them. Their rationality or mental lucidity was frighteningly seen in the manner in which they planned and carried out their act of terrorism in a precision-like manner. It showed a mass destruction mindset, which was able to think of new ways of mass destruction or mass disruption that do not occur to a normal mindset and is prepared to carry them out whatever be the costs involved. It made the world realise that what it is confronted with is a new breed of terrorists for whom terrorism is their viagra, which gives them a feeling of potence, of power, of invincibility. T he normal counter-terrorism methodology which involves equal attention to the political, economic, social, religious and security aspects of terrorism would not work against them. Even if all the political and other non-security aspects are dealt with, the new breed of terrorists would still indulge in their punishment terrorism, if they had the opportunity and the motivation, using some pretext or the other.
10. The most positive outcome of September 11 was the realisation by the international community that terrorism is an absolute evil and has to be combated as such, whatever be the objective of the terrorists and whether they were domestic or international terrorists. Another positive outcome was the realisation that the world cannot effectively deal with this new breed of terrorists without effective international co-operation. The networking of the terrorists has to be confronted by an equally determined networking of the political leaderships and professional experts of the civilised world. One has seen the emergence of such networking, but one is yet to see this axis of the civilised world being given an appropriate shape and structure so that it is able to deter effectively future acts of punishment
11. In a series of articles on Punishment Terrorism written in April, 2002, I had assessed as follows: "September 11, 2001, marked the culmination of the uncontrolled activities of the surviving dregs of the first Afghan war of the 1980s. The kidnapping and brutal murder of Daniel Pearl, the journalist of the Wall Street Journal, in Karachi marked the beginning of a new wave of terrorism arising from the dregs of the second Afghan war, which started on October 7, 2001. The world will be seeing more and more acts of international terrorism, largely directed against the US and deriving their inspiration from bin Laden, dead or alive, and the surviving dregs of the Pakistani pan-Islamic organisations. The pre-September 11 wave of international terrorism originating from the Pakistan-Afghanistan epicentre was largely the work of the Arab dregs of the first Afghan war, assisted by their Pakistani supporters. The post-September 11 wave of terrorism will be largely the work of the Pakistani dregs, reinforced by the Arabs and the angry elements from South-East Asia, which could emerge as the new epi-centre of international terrorism. bin Laden and his ilk will operate against the US wherever they think objective conditions for their success exist in the form of a weak intelligence and security apparatus and inadequate counter-terrorism capability. " The correctness of this assessment has been borne out by the prairie fire of punishment terrorist incidents in different parts of the world since then, which shows no signs of being extinguished.
LESSONS FROM 9/11
12.The lessons learnt from the post 9/11 international fight against terrorism are:
* Firstly, the need for a shift away from the overt military response, which was initially justified, to a more covert response. Counter-terrorism is a fight against the invisible force of the terrorists, who act with stealth and cunning. To be effective, the State's response has to be equally invisible, with equal stealth and cunning. How counter-productive an over-reliance on an overt military response can be could be seen from the Israeli actions in Palestine.
* Secondly, a realisation that in order to make terrorism wither away, it has to be denied not only funds, arms and ammunition and sanctuaries, but also---and more importantly--new reservoirs of fresh recruits. Its motivation has to be diluted. The greater the anger in the community from which the terrorists have arisen, the greater the flow of new recruits and the stronger the motivation. It is, therefore, important to ensure that the way counter-terrorism operations are conducted does not add to the already existing anger. Counter-terrorism is a fight of the civilised force of the State against the uncivilised force of the terrorists. If the unwise actions of the State make the community perceive it as no different from the uncivilised force of the terrorists, half the battle against the terrorists is already lost. bin Laden does not go round looking for recruits. Enraged elements in the Islamic world go to Pakistan and Afghanistan looking for bin Ladens and their ilk to help them in giving vent to their anger appropriately.
* Thirdly, greater pressure on the military-intelligence establishment in Pakistan to cut off its links with terrorists of various hues and to effectively co-operate with the coalition, instead of merely making a pretense of doing so.
PRE-REQUISITES FOR PREVENTION
13.What are the pre-requisites for effective prevention of terrorism?
* Firstly, an effective security apparatus which, through effective physical security measures, would be in a position to frustrate the plans of the terrorists even in the absence of timely intelligence.
* Secondly, an effective intelligence apparatus to collect timely strategic and tactical (preventive) intelligence. This is easier said than done. While technical intelligence (TECHINT) has been an important source of preventive intelligence, TECHINT alone would not be sufficient in many cases. Human intelligence (HUMINT) is necessary. Preventive HUMINT requires an ability to penetrate a terrorist organisation, either by recruiting an outside person and motivating him to enter the inner core of a terrorist organisation or by recruiting a person who is already in the inner core. Such penetration poses ethical problems since it involves conniving at an act of terrorism by the intelligence officer in order to enable the recruit win the confidence of the leader of the organisation. In view of such difficulties, there would always be gaps in HUMINT and this has to be kept in mind while strengthening the physical security measures.
* Thirdly, an effective analytical and assessment machinery. Terrorism is an unconventional war. Conventional tools of analysis would not suffice. Every intelligence collection and assessment organisation should have a set of officers, who are able to place themselves in the position of a terrorist and think, analyse and assess the various possibilities as an angry and irrational terrorist would do instead of merely as a calm and rational being would.
* Fourthly, a good linguistic capability---particularly in Arabic, Urdu and Pashtun. It is important to closely monitor all newspapers in these languages, which often carry more news on terrorism-related developments than the English media.
* Fifthly, a capability for a thorough monitoring of the World Wide Web, which is increasingly and effectively used by the terrorists for propaganda, motivation, interaction and clandestine communication purposes.
* Sixthly, constantly updated database on various aspects of terrorism.
* Seventhly, an effective and alert crisis management machinery to deal with acts of terrorism when they take place despite the best preventive efforts of the intelligence and security apparatus.
* Eighthly, a well-informed and lucid political leadership.
FREEDOM-FIGHTERS VS TERRORISTS
14. The pre-9/11 debate on the theme freedom-fighters vs terrorists has largely lost its relevance due to the traumatic experience of the international community after the horrendous acts of 9/11 and thereafter in different parts of the world. There is now a growing realisation in the world that the past attempts to rationalise the acts of terrorism of the organisations with national liberation as their objective by describing them as freedom-struggle have only played into the hands of terrorists.
15. The cliche that one nation's terrorist is another nation's freedom fighter, which was in vogue till the early 1980s, was sought to be questioned seriously after the 1983 car bomb explosion in Beirut in which a large number of US Marines were killed. George Bush , the father of the present US President and the then Vice-President, who was appointed by President Ronald Reagan as the Chairman of a Presidential Task Force on Terrorism, formulated the first clear distinction between freedom-fighters and terrorists in 1988. He said that any group or organisation, which deliberately targeted innocent civilians, could not be categorised as freedom-fighters and had to be treated as terrorists. This distinction found increasing acceptance thereafter, particularly after the terrorists fighting for their so-called national liberation relied more and more on explosive devices instead of hand-held weapons in order to cause the maximum number of casualties amongst the civilians and shake the confidence of the people in the ability of the State to protect them.
16. After the use of explosives by terrorists against the US Army barracks in Saudi Arabia in 1996 and against the US naval ship USS Cole in Aden in October 2000, this distinction has been further amplified by the US to precise that attacks on armed military personnel and installations would also constitute acts of terrorism if they take place in an area outside a zone of conflict. The US State Department's annual report on the Patterns of Global Terrorism during 2000 said: " We also consider as acts of terrorism attacks on military installations or on armed military personnel when a state of military hostilities does not exist at the site."
17. After 9/11, even Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Pakistan's military dictator, who previously used to describe the terrorists in Jammu & Kashmir as freedom-fighters, was forced to modify his position in his telecast speeches of January 11, 2002, and subsequently again in May, 2002, by stating that terrorism could not be justified under any circumstances even for achieving the so-called Kashmiri cause. He did not clarify what, in his perception, constituted terrorism, but from an examination of his speeches and other statements made on different occasions it is clear that he has come round to accepting, at least ostensibly, the view that an attack on civilians and non-military targets, whatever be the reason, constituted an act of terrorism.
18. The situation faced by India in J&K since 1989 is complex and different from any faced by other countries confronted by a revolt by their ethnic or religious minorities. In 1989,it started as a freedom-struggle by organisations such as the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) which advocated an independent Kashmir. By 1991, with the assistance of Pakistan, the leadership of the movement was taken over by organisations such as the Hizbul Mujahideen (HM) for fighting for the merger of the territory with Pakistan under the two-nation theory, which led to the partition of India in 1947 and the creation of Pakistan. Their agenda is largely territorial and not one of freedom.
19. Since 1993, the leadership has been taken over by a group of Pakistani pan-Islamic organisations led by the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JEM), all presently members of bin Laden's IIF. Their agenda is partly territorial (merger with Pakistan), partly religious (use of J&K as a base for "liberating" the Muslims in the rest of India) and partly pan-Islamic ( creation of Islamic caliphates in South-East, South and Central Asia).
20. How to characterise the acts of violence of these organisations--freedom-struggle or terrorism pure and simple? Till 1995, the international community was reluctant to accept India's contention that these Pakistani pan-Islamic organisations were terrorist organisations and their violent activities, whether directed against civilians or the security forces and military installations, could under no stretch of imagination be described as freedom struggle.
21. However, since 1995 its contention has been finding increasing acceptance---particularly so after 9/11. The USA declared the HUM as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation in October 1997 under a 1996 law under its then name of Harkat-ul-Ansar (HUA). The LET and the JEM were similarly declared so in December,2001. Canada and the UK too have taken similar action. Only the HUJI has not yet been declared to be so.
22. Pakistani sponsorship of pan-Islamic and indigenous terrorist organisations and its use of terrorism as a weapon against India to achieve its strategic objective without provoking a war have made the terrorism in J&K an "act of indirect aggression" and not a freedom struggle. A Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the UN approved by the UN General Assembly on October 24,1970, has laid down that "every State has the duty to refrain from organising, instigating, assisting,or participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or in acquiescing in organised activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts. " Subsequently, while speaking during a debate on another Declaration on the strengthening of International Security which was passed as Resolution No.2734 on December 16,1970, delegates from the USA, the UK, Canada, Italy, Australia, Japan and the then USSR described the sponsoring by a State of acts of terrorism against another State as indirect aggression.
23.The right of a victim-State to defend itself against such indirect aggression by the use of appropriate conventional as well as non-conventional means was underlined in an address delivered by George Shultz, the then US Secretary of State, after the signing on April 3,1984, by President Reagan of a National Security Directive on this subject and again later in a forward contributed by Vice-President Bush to a study on Terrorist Group Profiles in November,1988. Shultz described State-sponsored terrorism as a new form of warfare and said that the success of diplomatic options in dealing with State-sponsors of terrorism would depend on the readiness of the victim-State to hit back through conventional military and non-conventional clandestine means if the diplomatic options failed. He, therefore, expressed the determination of the US to follow a strategy of active defence, that is, taking the counter-terrorism operations into the territory or against the interests of the State-sponsor of terrorism, if left with no other alternative. Bush reiterated the determination of the US to demonstrate to State-sponsors of terrorism that their actions would not be cost-free. The Indian State has a similar right of active defence to protect itself and its citizens against terrorist operations mounted from Pakistani territory by taking the counter-terrorist operations into Pakistani territory, if necessary.
24.While the post-9/11 international opinion has shifted in favour of India with regard to the characterisation of these Pakistan-based pan-Islamic organisations as terrorist organisations and not freedom-fighters and the exercise of diplomatic pressure on Pakistan to wind up the infrastructure of these organisations in Pakistani territory, it is still reluctant to accept the need for India to exercise its right of active defence. However, talking to the media at Jammu on December 3, 2002,Robert Blackwill, the US Ambassador to India, said that the international campaign against terrorism was incomplete unless it was addressed in J&K. He added: "We will discuss with Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed how the US can be helpful in ending terrorism.The US and the United Nations have waged a war against terrorism and we cannot win so long as it exists against innocent people in the Valley. The terrorism in the state has to be ended completely.’’ This was a welcome acceptance that what India was facing in J&K was terrorism and not a freedom-strugglre
25. Any indigenous terrorist movement in the territory of a country due to domestic causes without any foreign involvement has to be tackled at the operational as well as political level. While acts of terrorism must be prevented and the capability of the organisations for such acts of terrorism must be neutralised, these must be combined with a political approach marked by a search for a mutually acceptable political solution through negotiations with the leaders of the organisations, which have taken to violence.
26.Where there is the involvement of foreign mercenaries and a foreign State in sponsoring the terrorism, the action against them has to be exclusively through operational means. There is no question of a political approach. No foreign national and no State should be allowed to indulge in or instigate acts of terrorism in the territory of another country, whatever be the cause.
27. The diminishing international sympathy for the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO), despite the perceived over-reaction of the Israeli Security Forces, because of the acts of terrorism against Israeli civilians indulged in by terrorist organisations allied to the PLO is another clear indicator that the international community is no longer prepared to accept any excuse for acts of terrorism, whatever be the cause.
SEPARATISM AND TERRORISM
28. Often, Pakistani and some other foreign analysts project the acts of terrorism in J&K as a freedom struggle and the insurgency in India's North-Eastern tribal belt and the pre-1995 acts of terrorism in Punjab as a struggle by tribal and Sikh separatists. The indigenous insurgents or terrorists, whether in the North-East or Punjab or J&K, look upon their struggle against the Government of India as a movement for "national liberation". As such, the observations made in the preceding paras relating to freedom-fighters vs terrorists would be valid in the case of the insurgent/terrorist movement of the tribal and Sikh separatists too.
29. However, what India has been facing in the North-East is a mix of insurgency and terrorism, whereas what it faced in Punjab before 1995 was terrorism pure and simple as in J&K. There are some qualitative differences between the modus operandi (MO) of an exclusively insurgent organisation and that of an exclusively terrorist organisation. An exclusively insurgent organisation avoids deliberate attacks on innocent civilians. It confines its attacks largely to the security forces and other Government personnel and seeks territorial control. In the territory controlled by it, it tries to set up the paraphernalia of a State or Government structure in the form of tax collection, policing and judicial machineries. It avoids causing undue suffering to the community on behalf of which it claims to be fighting. It organises its fighting cadres on the pattern of a conventional army with a hierarchial structure.
30. An exclusively terrorist organisation, on the other hand, relies totally on terror to intimidate the Government against which it is fighting and the majority community into conceding its demands. It is insensitive to the hardships caused by it to its community. It avoids control of territory and the creation of the paraphernalia of a conventional State and army structure to maintain the flexibility of its operational methods.
31.The Nagas and the Mizos in India's north-eastern tribal belt, in the initial stages of their revolt against the Government of India, had managed to set up such control over part of the territory and a paraphernalia of a State structure and a conventional army. Through effective counter-insurgency operations, the Government Security Forces managed to deprive the insurgents of their territorial control and decimate the infrastructure of their so-called Government and Army, forcing their leaders to seek sanctuary in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in the then East Pakistan. The attempts of the insurgents to maintain instability in the tribal areas through hit and run raids organised from their sanctuaries in the CHT with the help of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) were effectively countered, thereby making it clear to the insurgents that they would never be able to achieve their objective through violence.
32. Once this realisation sunk in, the Mizo and the Naga insurgents sought peace talks with the Government of India, which led to a political solution in Mizoram in the 1980s. In Nagaland too, agreement was reached with a major section of the insurgents, but a minor section constituting the faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) led by Issac Swu and T. Muivah is still negotiating with the Government and has not yet formally given up the insurgency, but it has been observing a cease-fire.
33. The terrorism in Punjab in support of the creation of an independent Khalistan was initiated in 1981 under the inspiration and instigation of some members of the Sikh diaspora in Canada, the USA, the UK and the then West Germany with the help of some adherents from the local Sikh community in Punjab. The movement could not gain even a modicum of international sympathy due to the actions of the terrorists belonging to the diaspora in organising acts of terrorism in foreign territory and against foreign nationals such as the blowing up of the Kanishka aircraft of Air India off the Irish coast and the explosion at the Narita airport of Tokyo in 1985 and the failed attempt to assassinate the Indian Ambassador to Bucharest and the kidnapping of Liviu Radu, a Romanian diplomat posted in New Delhi, in 1991. The terrorists failed to win much popular support in Punjab and their activities were brought under control by the excellent work done by the Punjab Police under the able leadership of K.P.S.Gill.
34. The lack of international interest in the separatist movements in the North-East and Punjab and the co-operation received by India from the Western countries in dealing with terrorism in Punjab in the form of exchange of intelligence etc could be attributed to the fact that they recognised these areas as an integral part of India and were disinclined to support the demands of the insurgent and terrorist groups for secession from India.
35. Their still lingering mental reservations in respect of J&K are due to the fact that they do not still recognise J&K as a territory whose legal status has been determined once and for all.Before 1995, the West was not even prepared to concede that there was terrorism in J&K. Only after the kidnapping of some American and West European tourists in 1995 by the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM) under the name of Al Faran was there a willingness to recognise that there was terrorism in J&K.
36. Pakistan has been supporting all these terrorist movements---whether in the North-East or Punjab or J&K---but with nuances. In the case of J&K, it talks openly of its right to extend political, moral and diplomatic support to the terrorists, whom it projects as freedom-fighters, because it considers the territory as rightfully belonging to it. However, it denies giving military support to the terrorists anywhere--neither in J&K, nor in Punjab nor in the North-East. In the case of Punjab and the North-East it does not talk of any right to extend political, moral or diplomatic support to the separatists since it recognises the areas affected by separatist movements as integral parts of India. There is no involvement of any Pakistan-based mercenary groups in any of these separatist movements in the North-East and Punjab, which have remained largely indigenous.
37. As a result, India has had no difficulty in dealing with them.
RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM AND TERRORISM
38. There have been in the past many instances of religious groups taking to terrorism to achieve their political and/or religious objectives. Examples are the anti-Protestant terrorism of the Irish Republican Army and its splinter groups and the retaliatory anti-Catholic terrorism of Protestant elements in Northern Ireland, the Al Jihad terrorism in Egypt for the enforcement of Islamic rule which led to the assassination of the then President Anwar Sadat in 1981, the anti-Shia terrorism of the Sunni extremist Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and its militant wing, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LEJ) and the retaliatory anti-Sunni terrorism of the Shia extremist Tehrik Jaffria Pakistan and is militant wing the Sipah Mohammad, the Sikh terrorism of the so-called Khalistan movement in Punjab in India, the anti-Muslim terrorism/insurgency of the Christians in East Timor and the Sudan etc. The movement for an independent Palestine State, which has had a significant sustaining influence on all Islam-based insurgencies or terrorism, is partly a national liberation movement and partly a movement motivated and sustained by the anger of the Muslims of not only Palestine, but also of other countries of the world over the Israeli control of the holy mosque (Al Aqsa) of East Jerusalem, which is the third most holy place for the Muslims after those of Saudi Arabia.
39. East Timor has already achieved independence. Attempts are underway to find a political solution to the Christian sectarian terrorism in Northern Ireland and the struggle of the Christian tribals in the Sudan for autonomy. The Sikh terrorism in Punjab has been dormant since 1995. As such, these movements presently do not pose any threat to regional or international peace and stability. The main concern of the international community today is due to the aggravating conflict between the Palestinians and Israel and the sprouting of many Islamic terrorist groups in different parts of the world---some fighting for Islamic rule under the Sharia and some fighting for national liberation on grounds of distinct religious identity--- and the attempts of bin Laden and his Al Qaeda to bring them together under a common umbrella of pan-Islamism.
40. This sprouting started from the end of the first Afghan war of the 1980s against the Soviet troops. About 6,000 or more Muslim mercenaries from different parts of the world, including bin Laden, were brought together by the USA's Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other Western Intelligence Agencies, got trained and armed through Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and used against the Soviet troops. For motivating them, the conflict in Afghanistan was projected as an Islam vs Communism and Muslims vs Atheists jihad (holy war) and religious fanaticism was consciously encouraged to produce martyrs in the jihad against the Communists.
41. The withdrawal of the Soviet troops in 1988, the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and of the pro-Moscow Najibullah Government in Kabul in April,1992,were perceived by these mercenaries and the innumerable Islamic fundamentalist organisations, which had sprouted in Pakistan under the patronage of the military-intelligence establishment during the war against the Soviet troops, as marking the power and invincibility of Islam as a political, religious and militant force. Their jihadi ardour remained and even increased, but the themes and the motivating slogans of the jihad changed. The new themes and slogans were Muslims Vs the Jews and the Crusaders, Islam Vs Western style democracy and Muslims Vs the infidels.
42. The soil of Pakistan saw the growth of a new brand of pan-Islamic fundamentalism the like of which one had not seen before in other Islamic countries infected with pan-Islamism. The typically Pakistani brand of pan-Islamism has three disconcerting features. Firstly, its advocacy of extra-territorial loyalty, that is, the loyalty of a Muslim is first to his religion and then only to the country of which he or she is a citizen or resident. Secondly, its assertion that a Muslim recognises only the frontiers of the Ummah and no national frontiers and hence has a right to go anywhere to wage a jihad to protect his religion. Thirdly, its contention that the Muslims have not only the right, but also the religious obligation to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WPD) and use them to protect their religion, if necessary.
43. As many of the dregs of the first Afghan war found their way back to their countries of origin, one saw a prairie fire of Islamic terrorism spreading across the world---Algeria, Egypt, the Arakan area of Myanmar, southern Phillipines, Indonesia, the Xinjiang province of China, J&K in India, the Central Asian Republics (CAR), and Chechnya and Dagestan in Russia. These movements had different objectives in different countries----Islamic rule under the Sharia in Algeria, Egypt, the CARs and Indonesia, national liberation followed by Islamic rule in the Arakan, southern Philippines, Xinjiang, Dagestan and Chechnya and independence or merger with Pakistan in J&K. There are also organisations in Xinjiang and J&K, which call for only independence and not Islamic rule.
44. Despite the fact that their Islamic identity and belief in the right of the Muslims to wage a jihad were common motivating factors regardless of any differences in their ultimate objective, there was no attempt till 1998 to network these organisations and co-ordinate their activities. It was bin Laden, who in 1998 brought many, if not all of these Islamic terrorist organisations together under the common umbrella of pan-Islamism. For this purpose, he exploited the common anger of the Muslims all over the world against Israel over Palestine and the continued Israeli control of the Al Aqsa mosque of Jerusalem and against the US over its perceived support to Zionism and Israel, over the sufferings allegedly inflicted by it on the people of Iraq and over its allegedly anti-Islam policies, particularly since the Gulf war of 1991.
45. Thus was born in 1998 the International Islamic Front (IIF) for Jihad Against the Crusaders and the Jewish People, commonly known as the IIF for Jihad against the US and Israel with its headquarters in Kandahar in Afghanistan. At least 13 Islamic terrorist organisations---five from Pakistan, three from Egpt, two from the CARs, the Abu Sayyaf of the southern Philippines, the Taliban and the Al Qaeda---joined it. The Al Qaeda itself is an exclusively Arab organisation, which has brought together under bin Laden's leadership the survivors of the Arab mercenaries who had fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s and subsequent fresh recruits. Bin Laden heads Al Qaeda as well as the IIF.
46. bin Laden set up a training infrastructure in Afghanistan where not only the cadres of the various components of the IIF, but also a large number of individual Muslims, aggrieved for various reasons, from different countries of the world who had flocked to Kandahar, were trained. In order to unite them into a single force, he initially used them to help the Taliban in its fight against the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. For moulding this IIF, he used the united front strategy previously adopted by International Communism to bring together the various Communist and pro-Communist insurgencies of the world and subsequently by Carlos to network the various terrorist organisations such as the Popular Front For the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the West German Red Army faction, the Kurds of Turkey, Al Zulfiquar of Pakistan etc under the common theme of struggle against capitalism and Zionism.
47. When bin Laden announced the formation of the International Islamic Front (IIF) in the beginning of 1998 and issued its first fatwa, it designated the USA and Israel ( the crusaders and the Jewish people as he put it) as the principal enemies of Islam and called for attacks on them. In many of his subsequent statements, this characterisation of the US and Israel as the principal enemies of Islam has been a recurring theme. However, despite this, Al Qaeda and the other components of the IIF had confined their attacks mainly to US and other Western targets and avoided attacks on Israeli nationals and interests, though some Jewish persons were reported to have been killed in the terrorist strike by Al Qaeda in Tunisia earlier this year.
48. This was due to the anxiety of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and other organisations allied to it not to be perceived by the USA as having links with Al Qaeda or the IIF. The PLO used to be of the view that the Palestinians would never be able to achieve their political objective without the support of the USA and, therefore, wanted that the Palestinian organisations should keep away from bin Laden. While there are Palestinians serving in Al Qaeda, no Palestinian organisation is a member of the IIF. Bin Laden too respected the concerns of the Palestinian organisations and avoided any terrorist strike against Israeli targets lest there be any dificulties for the Palestinian organisations in their attempt to get the political support of the West against Israel.
49. If the strikes in Mombasa (November 28,2002) are established to be the work of Al Qaeda or the IIF, this would show that this consideration no longer acts as a restraining factor. Either Al Qaeda and the IIF have decided to strike at Israeli targets without worrying about the concerns of the Palestinian organisations or they undertook the Mombasa operations with the approval or at the instance of the Palestinian organisations, which have been disillusioned with the failure of the US to restrain Israel and, therefore, see no longer any need to keep away from bin Laden. More attacks on Israeli lives and interests are likely .
50.Al Qaeda has not mounted any major act of punishment terrorism in J&K and other parts of India, either against India or against Israel or against the USA due to the following reasons:
* Firstly, like the Palestinians,the indigenous Kashmiri groups, whose local support is necessary for a major terrorist strike, feel that they cannot achieve their objective without US support and , therefore, do not want any Al Qaeda operation against the US or Israel in Indian territory. The Hizbul Mujahideen (HM), presently the most active indigenous Kashmiri group, has scrupulously kept away from Al Qaeda and the Taliban. The latter too did not like the HM because of its past association with Gulbuddin Heckmatyar's Hizb-e-Islami (HEI). However, after October 7,2001, the HEI has been operating in Afghanistan in co-operation with the Taliban and Al Qaeda against the US troops and the Hamid Karzai Government.
* Secondly, to be able to mount a successful terrorist strike against the USA or Israel in other parts of India, Al Qaeda would need local support. In Pakistan and other Islamic countries, particularly of West Asia, the political, military and intelligence establishments had generally been pro-USA, but large sections of the population have been anti-American. The reverse is the case in India.
* Thirdly, the non-Pakistani components of the International Islamic Front from Egypt, the CARs and the Philippines do not look upon India as anti-Islam despite the anger of the Indian Muslim community over the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the alleged massacre of Muslims in Mumbai in December,1992, and in Gujarat in February-March, 2002. Because of this, past attempts of the Pakistani components to have the Front re-named as the International Islamic Front For Jihad Against the US, Israel and India did not succeed despite the support of bin Laden for such a move. Foreign Muslims note that despite the large casualties suffered by India in J&K since 1989 (nearly 14,000 innocent civilians and 3,500 security forces personnel killed), India had not resorted to air strikes, destroyed or damaged mosques, madrasas and the Holy Koran, forcibly shaved off the beards of arrested terrorists, seized their copies of the Holy Koran due to fears that they might be using them as secret code books and substituted them with Holy Koran printed by the Army, prevented the Muslim detenus from praying in a group, or tried them in camera before military tribunals as, according to them, the USA has been doing in Afghanistan. They also note that during the recent massacre of Muslims in Gujarat, it was the Indian print and electronic media and large sections of the Indian elite, including Hindu leaders, who highlighted the massacre and went to the help of the Muslims. In contrast, since October 7,2001, practically the entire US elite, including its academics, have been observing a strange silence over what the Muslims regard as the atrocities committed by the US towards those arrested in Afghanistan. They compare the active role played by the US media and academic elite in bringing to light the atrocities committed by the US troops against the Vietnamese in the 1960s and 1970s with its conscious inactivism since October 7,2001, and allege that this inactivism is because the victims now are Muslims for whom the US society as a whole feels no sympathy.
51.Does it mean that India does not have to fear any major act of punishment terrorism? It would be incorrect to come to such a conclusion. There is considerable anger against the Government of India amongst the dregs of the second Afghan war over its alleged support to the Northern Alliance. Past anger amongst Indian Muslims over the demolition of the Babri Musjid has been aggravated by the recent massacres in Gujarat. There had been massacres of the members of the minority communities (Sikhs and Muslims) during communal riots in the past too, but what, in the perception of the Muslims, distinguishes the recent happenings in Gujarat from those of the past is the total insensitivity of the local administration to the feelings of the Muslims and what they regard as its conscious inactivism and the absence of even a modicum of effort by the Government towards a healing touch. There is, therefore, a strong possibility of a major act of punishment terrorism in the coming months organised either by the components of the IIF or by enraged sections of the local Muslims. An encore of Mumbai--March
1993 cannot be ruled out.
52. In a recent statement attributed to bin Laden, which has been circulating in the Internet, he has been quoted as criticising the USA, inter alia, for supporting India on the Kashmir issue. This is perhaps for the first time that he has cited US support to India on the Kashmir issue as one of the causes for the Muslim anger against the US. One should, therefore, be alert to the possibility that Al Qaeda or one of the other components of the IIF might organise in Indian territory a terrorist strike directed against US or other Western (including Australian) or Israeli targets. The Pakistanis could also encourage such an attack in the hope that this could create difficulties in India's relations with the USA and Israel.
53. Pan-Islamic Mullas of Pakistan such as Mufti Nizamuddin Shamzai, the head of the Binori madrasa of Karachi, have had a strong influence on the thinking of bin Laden. He and his Al Qaeda and IIF have adopted as their own the disconcerting ideas and rhetoric of the pan-Islamic Mullas of Pakistan such as the Muslims' extra-territorial loyalty, non-recognition by Muslims of national frontiers, the need for an Islamic atomic bomb at the disposal of the Ummah, and the right and the religious obligation of the Muslims to acquire and use WMD to protect their religion, if necessary.
54. The international community ought, therefore, to be concerned over the dangers of Pakistan's nuclear arsenal falling into the hands of these pan-Islamic terrorists or of pro-fundamentalist elements in Pakistan's scientific community transferring knowledge and expertise to the terrorists. Such fears cannot be dismissed lightly after the arrest and interrogation of two retired nuclear scientists of Pakistan by the USA's Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) earlier this year. The interrogation reportedly established that they had visited Kandahar before 9/11 and met bin Laden. However, there was no evidence to establish that their visit was in connection with bin Laden's attempts to acquire a WMD capability.
55. One has some knowledge of the extent of the penetration of pro-bin Laden terrorist organisations into the Pakistani Army, particularly after the arrest of Maj.Gen.Zaheer-ul-Islam Abbasi, former chief of the ISI station in New Delhi in the late 1980s, and some other officers by the Pakistan Army in 1995 on a charge of plotting to overthrow the Government and setting up an Islamic Caliphate with the co-operation of the HUJI. However, one has very little idea of the extent of any penetration of pro-bin Laden elements into Pakistan's scientific community. The Pakistani media had reported in the past, without mentioning names, about the presence of Pakistani scientists at the annual conventions of the LET, another member of the IIF.
56. The clandestine transfer of military nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea, with or without the knowledge of the military-intelligence establishment, underlines the dangers of a similar transfer to the pan-Islamic terrorist elements. In an interview to the Indian media before his visit to India from December 3 to 5,2002, President Putin had given eloquent expression to such fears. According to "The Hindu" (December 1,2002) of Chennai, he said: "What we are worried about is not only the fact that weapons of mass destruction could fall into the hands of bandits and terrorists . Not only that is dangerous, but we also have concerns they (terrorists) could obtain information concerning production techniques of even simple means that could be equal to weapons of mass destruction in their destructive potential. We take note of the statements made by President Musharraf that the military potential of his country is safely protected, strictly under control. But, to be frank, our concerns, our anxiety still persist."
57. For counter-terrorism experts, dealing with pan-Islamic terrorist groups poses the greatest challenge. All the suggestions for standard policy palliatives from many analysts such as addressing the cause of terrorism, an economic package, better governance, etc will not put an end to their terrorism. Global co-opertation and intensification of the attempts to neutralise them are the only answer. At the same time, care has to be taken that the intelligence agencies and security forces do not drive more Muslims into the arms of these terrorists through over-reaction. Any impression that they are suspecting the Muslim communities as a whole because of some of their co-religionists taking to terrorism and unwise talk of clash of civilisations would only aggravate the feelings of alienation of the Muslims and play into the hands of terrorists.
58. A more nuanced approach would be necessary towards ideological and ethnic terrorist organisations and also towards religious terrorist organisation with no links to Al Qaeda and its associates.While Governments confronted with terrorist organisations of a class-oriented or issue-based or anarchist nature often succeed in bringing them under control, if not in totally eliminating them, by taking advantage of their lack of public support, Governments confronted with terrorist organisations, which are community or religion oriented, have difficulty in controlling them.
59. An important reason for this is the ambivalence of the community or the religious group from which these organisations have arisen. While the majority may not support the use of terror by these organisations to achieve their aims, their shared perception of their grievances, of the nature of the ruling power or administration and of their relationship with what they look upon as the adversary community or religious group make them, hesitant or unwilling, to back the ruling administration in its counter-terrorism operations. Another reason for their ambivalence is, of course, intimidation.
60. All terrorist organisations having national liberation as their objective adopt political as well as terroristic methods in tandem, with the political and the terrorist wings kept separate at least overtly. While the political wing aims to create an awareness of and sympathy for the political objective of the organisation by highlighting the human rights aspects of the problem, the terrorist wing acts as the cutting edge to make the ruling power or administration realise that it has no other alternative but to concede their demands.
61.It is said that terrorism makes Hamlets of decision-makers. It poses more questions than it provides answers. How to deal with it? Th